CIP-0114: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV Program
- Please see below for open discussion.
Number: CIP-TBD Title: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV Program Author(s): Mark Wendland w/ Community proposal Type: Tokenomics Status: Draft Created: 2026-03-19 License: CC0-1.0
Abstract
This proposal establishes a time-bound Super Validator (SV) program to encourage the formation and growth of Digital Asset Treasury companies (DATs) that provide investor access to Canton Coin (CC) and commit to long-term CC ownership.
A DAT is an operating company whose primary purpose is to acquire, accumulate, and hold CC as a treasury asset while offering third parties structured access to CC exposure. DATs that accumulate and hold CC over multi-year periods provide durable ecosystem value and may earn SV rewards based on verifiable, consistent CC holdings.
Motivation
The current tokenomics framework primarily rewards active participation in validation and application activity but does not explicitly incentivize long-term capital formation or treasury-based accumulation of CC.
This creates a gap in the ecosystem where:
Long-term aligned capital is under-incentivized
Institutional participation via structured vehicles is limited
Market stability mechanisms tied to sustained holding are weak
The DAT program addresses this by:
Encouraging purpose-built treasury entities
Aligning incentives with long-term CC ownership
Expanding access to CC through regulated financial structures
Supporting deeper liquidity and ecosystem credibility
Rationale
The design prioritizes verifiability, durability, and alignment:
Quarterly evaluation ensures ongoing commitment rather than one-time qualification
Escrow and staged release aligns incentives over time
High AUM threshold ($100M) filters for serious institutional participants
Weight tied to holdings directly links influence to economic commitment
Alternative approaches considered:
Immediate full weight allocation → rejected due to lack of long-term alignment
No holding requirements → rejected due to risk of short-term gaming
Lower AUM thresholds → rejected to maintain program quality and signaling value
Concerns addressed:
Prevents passive holders from qualifying (explicit exclusions)
Avoids reward farming through earned CC
Ensures program cap limits systemic impact
Specification
Maximum allocation: SV Weight 20
Enrollment window: 12 months from CIP approval
Participant Review and Weight Release cadence: Quarterly per qualifying DAT from the day of acceptance into the program.
No pre-escrow: SV Weight is escrowed only upon a weight allocation being confirmed by the Canton Foundation (CF) or its delegates and the necessary on-chain votes completing successfully.
Program Administration: The CF delegates that will administer this program and make relevant decisions outlined in this CIP will be the CF Tokenomics Committee aided by the Accountability Working Group within the CF Tokenomics committee.
Definition: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT)For the purposes of this proposal, a Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) is defined as:
A publicly traded company whose primary corporate purpose is the acquisition, accumulation, and long-term holding of CC
Structured to provide third-party investor access (e.g., equity, trust interests, notes, or similar instruments)
Explicit Exclusions
The following do not qualify as DATs:
Public companies that incidentally hold CC on their balance sheet
ETFs, index funds, or passive investment vehicles
Custodians, exchanges, or intermediaries holding CC on behalf of clients
Trading firms or yield-driven vehicles
This program is intended to apply to purpose-built CC treasury companies, not passive holders.
Eligibility Requirements
To participate, a DAT must meet all of the following:
Initial Minimum AUM
Greater than $100 million in total assets under management when the DAT enters into the program for the first time. This AUM calculation will be defined as:
AUM = Current DAT CC holdings * Purchase Price for Each CC
Supporting transaction details including but not limited to the CC quantity purchased, the price each CC was purchased at, and the date/time of each purchase must be shared with the CF during the application process to join the program.
Define the DAT’s “Floor CC Quantum” and “CC Quantum” to be equal to Current DAT holdings at the time of their approval to participate in this program.Strategic Market Participation
Operates in a strategic geographic market (e.g., United States, Japan, Korea, or other jurisdictions approved by CF or its delegates)
Primary Purpose Test
The entity’s primary purpose must be long-term CC treasury accumulation
Attestation Capability
Ability to attest to CC holdings in a manner acceptable to the CF or its delegates.
Foundation Approval
CF or its delegates review and approval of DAT business model
The DAT can apply for CF or its delegates approval upon reaching $100M AUM as defined in “Initial Minimum AUM”
SV Reward Mechanics
Weight Accrual Formula
Eligible DATs may earn SV Weight according to the following ratio:
1 SV Weight per $50 million equivalent of CC acquired at qualification
This SV Weight may be earned at the time of a DAT’s entrance into the program or on each future quarterly review of the DATs participation in the program. For the later, this is possible if, during a quarterly review, it is determined the DAT has accrued sufficient new CC above CC Quantum to meet the next weight awarding milestone.
Any added CC above CC Quantum which is not sufficient to merit a weight increase for a DAT’s SV during a quarterly review can be rolled over into the next quarterly review (“Stub CC”), in addition to any other newly added CC, for calculating a potential increase in weight at that time. Such a weight increasing claim by the SV must be supplemented with supporting transaction details including but not limited to the CC quantity purchased, the price each CC was purchased at, and the date/time of each purchase.
Total SV Weight earned is subject to the program cap of SV Weight 20.
For the avoidance of doubt, given the Initial Minimum AUM requirement of $100M this means that a new DAT entering this program will begin with at least 2 SV weight allocated except in the scenario in which such new weight would exceed the program’s weight cap. In that case the SV will be limited to weight equal to the remaining available weight up to the program’s weight cap.
CC Position Recording
Upon acceptance into this program, the DAT records the following with the CF as part of the application for the program:
The exact number of CC units acquired and held at the time of approval into program (“CC Unit Number”); and
The purchase price of each CC unit in scope for the program with supporting documentation.
Set the DAT’s “Floor CC Quantum” and “CC Quantum” to be equal to the CC Unit Number established above
During future quarterly evaluations, if the DAT has accrued and holds New CC such that New CC notional value as defined in “Weight Accrual Formula” is >= $50 million, the SV is eligible to earn 1 incremental SV weight per each incremental $50 million notional of New CC. In the event this happens, add the portion of New CC that is sufficient to meet the newly earned weight threshold to CC Quantum to create the DAT’s updated CC Quantum. Any of the DAT’s New CC not included in the updated CC Quantum shall be considered Stub CC and may be used for future weight unlocks. For the purposes of this section:
New CC = DAT’s CC holdings at Measurement Round – CC Quantum.
Measurement Round = The Mainnet round number during which the quarterly evaluation is conducted.
For the avoidance of doubt, CC earned by the DAT via participation in SV, Validator, or Application rewards may not be included for the purposes of this program.
Escrow & Release Structure
Qualification & Escrow
When the DAT has met the criteria to earn weight, the corresponding SV Weight is added to a DAT ghost SV
Quarterly Evaluation
Every quarter, the DAT must hold ≥ the recorded CC quantum
If the requirement is met, the quarterly portion of SV rewards is released. If not, trigger the actions in “Failure to Maintain Holdings”.
Reward & Weight Release
50% of the relevant allocated SV weight is released after the first quarterly review of the DAT following that weight being allocated to the DAT provided they continue to hold CC > CC Quantum.
Each successive quarter over the next four quarters releases ¼ of the remaining 50% of the earned SV weight (1 year) provided the DAT’s CC holdings at the time of the relevant quarterly review >= CC Quantum
Escrowed CC Release
Each time weight is released to the SV, any accrued and escrowed CC associated with that weight is released to the DAT.
Failure to Maintain Holdings
If at any quarterly checkpoint the DAT holds less than the current CC Quantum (“High Water Mark”):
The DAT’s SV weight is reduced such that it is now equivalent to weight associated with the highest previously achieved CC Quantum that is less than the DAT’s Current CC held.
All pending weight and reward releases are paused until the DAT’s Currently Held CC is again >= High Water Mark. Any rewards associated with this reduced weight (including any that are “paused”) continue to accrue in escrow for the next quarter.
During the following quarterly checkpoint:
If the DAT has accrued and holds CC >= High Water Mark, any paused weight unlocks resume from where their schedule had paused and any SV rewards that would have otherwise been released to the DAT are now released. For the avoidance of doubt, in this case the DAT’s full timeline will be extended to allow for each planned quarterly review to take place despite the pause.
If the DAT has failed to accrue and hold CC >= High Water Mark during the first quarterly check point they are afforded a second quarterly cycle and check point to re-meet the High-Water Mark. In the event they fail to do so during the second quarterly checkpoint any escrowed rewards associated with the reduced weight are burnt and the SV no longer has a claim on them. Similarly, the reduced weight is returned to the program’s weight pool to potentially be earned by an SV in the future.
In the event that a DAT has spent two quarterly cycles with CC holdings < Floor CC Quantum, the DAT is removed from this program, its SV weight is reduced to 0, any escrowed reward coupons allocated to the DAT are burned, and it forfeits its SV.
Example
NewDAT launches and acquires X CC
NewDAT records its CC quantum with the Foundation
Based on acquisition size, 1.0 SV Weight is allocated to ghost validator escrow
Quarterly Releases (1-Year Period)
Total release schedule: 4 quarters
.5 SV Weight is released in the first quarter of meeting the weight
Quarterly release amount: 0.125 SV Weight per quarter of the remaining weight
At the first quarterly checkpoint:
If NewDAT holds ≥ X CC:
0.5 SV Weight is released
At each quarterly checkpoint:
If NewDAT holds ≥ X CC:
0.125 SV Weight is released
If NewDAT holds < X CC:
Weight is lowered to new threshold
No rewards are released but held in escrow for the lower tier
Upon achieving the high-water mark again, rewards in escrow will be released per the quarterly schedule
This process continues for up to 1 year, with a maximum of 1.0 SV Weight released if all quarterly conditions are met.
Program Constraints
SV Weight cap: 20 total
Enrollment window: 12 months
Non-transferable: Weight earned under this program may not be reassigned
No pre-committed escrow: No SV Weight may be escrowed without a qualifying DAT
This CIP is licensed under CC0-1.0: Creative Commons CC0 1.0 Universal
- Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted. - sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposalif fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this docOn Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message. - toggle quoted message Show quoted textWe view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:
Hold CC for some time --> get more CC
The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle). This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance. This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.
If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:- Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
- Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
- Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
- Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule
We believe that these changes will:- Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
- Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
- simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
- Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
- Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities
We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposalif fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this docOn Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message. - Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- toggle quoted message Show quoted textThe DAT has to manage to raise the funds to be able to acquire and hold the tokens for a long timeIt's not just about holdingOn Mar 19, 2026, at 12:56 PM, Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:
Hold CC for some time --> get more CC
The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle). This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance. This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.
If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:- Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
- Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
- Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
- Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule
We believe that these changes will:- Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
- Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
- simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
- Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
- Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities
We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposalif fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this docOn Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message. - Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- toggle quoted message Show quoted text
Does a DAT have to operate an SV to qualify?
From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> On Behalf Of Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2026 12:56 PM
To: cip-discuss@...
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramYou don't often get email from anthony=modulo.finance@.... Learn why this is important
We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:
Hold CC for some time --> get more CC
The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle). This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance. This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.
If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:- Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
- Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
- Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
- Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule
We believe that these changes will:
- Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
- Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
- simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
- Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
- Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities
We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:
sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposal
if fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this doc
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:
Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. When in doubt, contact netGenius.
- Thanks Mark for putting this together. I think this proposal makes a strong case for community support.
One gap in many L1 ecosystems is that incentives are usually designed for validators & app builders, but less for institutional or treasury-oriented participants seeking long-term exposure without operating infrastructure. This CIP is a thoughtful way to address that.
What I find particularly interesting is the discipline in the design: the high entry threshold, quarterly attestations, staged weight release + the ejection rule all help ensure this is a program for active & durable participants rather than short-term opportunistic moves.
Such proposal should bring more long-term/aligned capital to Canton. - toggle quoted message Show quoted textApologies for delay in replying. No, operating a SV is not a requirement.
Are there any other questions or feedback on the CIP?
On Mar 19, 2026, at 11:30 AM, James Lang via lists.sync.global <james=libertycityventures.com@...> wrote:
Does a DAT have to operate an SV to qualify?
From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> On Behalf Of Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2026 12:56 PM
To: cip-discuss@...
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramYou don't often get email from anthony=modulo.finance@.... Learn why this is important
We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:
Hold CC for some time --> get more CC
The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle). This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance. This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.
If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:- Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
- Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
- Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
- Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule
We believe that these changes will:
- Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
- Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
- simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
- Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
- Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities
We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:
sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposal
if fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this doc
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:
Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. When in doubt, contact netGenius.
- I agree with Joris, I think the CIP as proposed is well designed in how it address the mechanics of the program. It should make it reasonably easy to manage by the foundation.In response to some of Anthony's comments (thanks btw!):
- The way this is structured should support identifiable party IDs for monitoring. If helpful, could add something to the effect of requiring any CC associated with this program being in a PartyID (or PartyIDs) separate and distinct from any other CC that the DAT may hold.
- I think the proposal to cap the total weight available to a fixed number and allocate it to specific program participants rather than as a % based pro-rata distribution is the appropriate approach. Since total SV weight of the network may increase/decrease over time that could lead to a SV weight for the program that ebbs and flows as well. The same can be said for the number of participants in the program. I think that adds unnecessary complexity--as the foundation would need to create a post-fact calculation, reconciliation, and distribution mechanism. In my opinion, one goal for this program is ease of administering it. Using the existing fixed-weight SV model will accomplish that.
ThanksChris - toggle quoted message Show quoted textClarifying the timing on this CIP.
CIP eligibility window is 12months upon CIP approval
CIP weight earning milestones are 24months upon CIP approval
From: Mark Wendland
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2026 6:49 PM
To: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Cc: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramApologies for delay in replying. No, operating a SV is not a requirement.
Are there any other questions or feedback on the CIP?
On Mar 19, 2026, at 11:30 AM, James Lang via lists.sync.global <james=libertycityventures.com@...> wrote:
Does a DAT have to operate an SV to qualify?
From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> On Behalf Of Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2026 12:56 PM
To: cip-discuss@...
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramYou don't often get email from anthony=modulo.finance@.... Learn why this is important
We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:
Hold CC for some time --> get more CC
The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle). This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance. This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.
If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:- Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
- Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
- Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
- Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule
We believe that these changes will:
- Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
- Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
- simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
- Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
- Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities
We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:
sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposal
if fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this doc
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:
Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. When in doubt, contact netGenius.
- toggle quoted message Show quoted text7RIDGE/Ci is happy to sponsor or endorse this CIP.
Thank you everyone for your input!!
Veronica
V E R O N I C A A U G U S T S S O N / P A R T N E R
7RIDGE IS A PRIVATE MARKETS ASSET MANAGER INVESTED IN TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGY FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES TO POWER THE GLOBAL ECONOMY Signature for V e r o n i c a A u g u s t s s o n
Från: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> för Mark Wendland via lists.sync.global <mwendland=cantonstrategic.com@...>
Skickat: Monday, April 13, 2026 4:33:18 PM
Till: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Ämne: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramClarifying the timing on this CIP.
CIP eligibility window is 12months upon CIP approval
CIP weight earning milestones are 24months upon CIP approval
From: Mark Wendland
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2026 6:49 PM
To: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Cc: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramApologies for delay in replying. No, operating a SV is not a requirement.
Are there any other questions or feedback on the CIP?
On Mar 19, 2026, at 11:30 AM, James Lang via lists.sync.global <james=libertycityventures.com@...> wrote:
Does a DAT have to operate an SV to qualify?
From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> On Behalf Of Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2026 12:56 PM
To: cip-discuss@...
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramYou don't often get email from anthony=modulo.finance@.... Learn why this is important
We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:
Hold CC for some time --> get more CC
The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle). This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance. This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.
If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:- Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
- Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
- Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
- Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule
We believe that these changes will:
- Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
- Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
- simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
- Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
- Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities
We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:
sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposal
if fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this doc
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:
Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. When in doubt, contact netGenius.
- toggle quoted message Show quoted text
From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> on behalf of Veronica Augustsson via lists.sync.global <veronica=7ridge.com@...>
Sent: Monday, April 13, 2026 5:15 PM
To: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Cc: Sophia Grami <sophia@...>
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV Program7RIDGE/Ci is happy to sponsor or endorse this CIP.
Thank you everyone for your input!!
Veronica
V E R O N I C A A U G U S T S S O N/P A R T N E R
7RIDGE IS A PRIVATE MARKETS ASSET MANAGER INVESTED IN TRANSFORMATIVE TECHNOLOGY FOR FINANCIAL SERVICES TO POWER THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
Signature for V e r o n i c a A u g u s t s s o n
Från: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> för Mark Wendland via lists.sync.global <mwendland=cantonstrategic.com@...>
Skickat: Monday, April 13, 2026 4:33:18 PM
Till: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Ämne: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramClarifying the timing on this CIP.
CIP eligibility window is 12months upon CIP approval
CIP weight earning milestones are 24months upon CIP approval
From: Mark Wendland
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2026 6:49 PM
To: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Cc: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...>
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramApologies for delay in replying. No, operating a SV is not a requirement.
Are there any other questions or feedback on the CIP?
On Mar 19, 2026, at 11:30 AM, James Lang via lists.sync.global <james=libertycityventures.com@...> wrote:
Does a DAT have to operate an SV to qualify?
From: cip-discuss@... <cip-discuss@...> On Behalf Of Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global
Sent: Thursday, March 19, 2026 12:56 PM
To: cip-discuss@...
Subject: Re: [cip-discuss] CIP-TBD: Digital Asset Treasury (DAT) SV ProgramYou don't often get email from anthony=modulo.finance@.... Learn why this is important
We view this as staking because we're reducing the process to the underlying incentive mechanism:
Hold CC for some time --> get more CC
The only qualifying requirements we see are related to the notional quantity of the CC and the nature of the holding vehicle (a publicly listed investment vehicle). This implies that these are critical qualifiers for eligibility of CC yield via SV token issuance. This also implies that lesser notional values or other entity types that choose to commit to holding CC are not similarly accretive to the broader ecosystem.
If these qualifiers are necessary for value accretion to the ecosystem, we believe the following adjustments would create a more sustainable program over time:- Create an public investment SV sub-type or category. These SVs should use a similar framework to report on CC acquisitions and holdings and should be automatically eligible for approval if they meet the criteria.
- Allocate a fixed percentage (20/350? 10%?) of the SV issuance to the investment SV sub-type
- Require each public investment SV to maintain a dedicated party for CC holdings monitoring
- Observe the total CC held by each public investment SV on a daily basis to calculate pro-rata CC share
- Distribute the public investment SV sub-type tokens pro-rata to all eligible entities on a regular schedule
We believe that these changes will:
- Reduce uncertainty around token issuance as SV weights are awarded, reduced, or burned over time for the broader set of infrastructure providers
- Simplify direct monitoring across investment entities via pre-defined partyIDs
- simplify reward calculations (e.g. 10% of 2B CC = 200m CC or ~$29m per year available for investment entities)
- Create a clear and consistent incentive for new investment entities
- Simplify the ecosystem cost calculation by pre-defining the total tokens being issued to investment entities
We also believe that a broader, more inclusive version of this type of program could be considered for token issuance outside of the SV pool but will leave those concepts out of this discussion.
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 10:28 AM Eric Saraniecki via lists.sync.global <eric=digitalasset.com@...> wrote:
sorry - Im failing to understand your point about staking in this proposal
if fully earned, this would allocate 20 out of ~ 350 SV weight for DATs who meet the criteria proposed in this doc
On Thu, Mar 19, 2026 at 11:20 AM Anthony Merriman via lists.sync.global <anthony=modulo.finance@...> wrote:
Really interesting concept - thank you for working through this!
From our perspective, this proposal effectively reallocates a large portion of the SV token issuance pool to CC staking. We are generally supportive of adjusting CC token issuance to best align long-term interests of the network and support continued development in the Canton ecosystem.
If the network feels this direction is appropriate, we believe a more generalized staking incentive pool (not only SV tokens) would be more appropriate. Choosing to reallocate SV tokens into staking rewards for a single entity is punitive for existing SVs. If staking CC is deemed to be a valuable economic activity, the entire network benefits and the entire network should subsidize the activity, not just the SV pool. We also do not see value in limiting the availability of this type of activity if it is deemed valuable. A more strategic approach would enable any entity or application to participate in staking CC and allow the market to set the fair yield for staking based on aggregate supply and demand.
Additionally, we believe it's worth evaluating how much fundamental economic value is created by staking or locking CC. Staking/locking mechanisms do not generate revenue for the network nor do they create true demand for purchasing CC. We believe that main impact of liquidity manipulation is to change the temporal distribution of CC sales. Staking/locking can also create misaligned incentives and can accelerate liquidity crunches (the value of future issuance declines as CC price declines, incentivizing liquidation of existing holdings because the NPV of the SV weight or staking weight is also reduced).
We believe the grant fund allocation is a good comparison for potential CC staking token issuance. If CC staking is more valuable than the grant program, perhaps 10% of the total CC issuance should be allocated for staking. If CC staking is less valuable than the grant program, less than 5% would be warranted.
This message, and any attachments, is for the intended recipient(s) only, may contain information that is privileged, confidential and/or proprietary and subject to important terms and conditions available at http://www.digitalasset.com/emaildisclaimer.html. If you are not the intended recipient, please delete this message.Caution: This email originated from outside of the organization. Do not click links or open attachments unless you recognize the sender and know the content is safe. When in doubt, contact netGenius.
